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Abstract
One of the main tasks of IT business continuity
planing (BCP) is guaranteeing that incidents affecting
the IT infrastructure do not affect the availability of
IT-dependent business processes beyond a given accept-
able extent. Carrying out BCP of information systems
is particularly challenging because it has to take into
consideration the numerous interdependencies between
IT assets typically present in an IT-based organization.
In this paper we present a model and a tool support-
ing BCP auditing by allowing IT personnel to estimate
and validate the Recovery Time Objectives (to be) set
on the various processes of the organization. Our tool
can be integrated in COBIT-based risk assessment ap-
plications. Finally, we argue that our tool can be par-
ticularly useful for the continuous auditing of the BCP.
1 Introduction
Business Continuity (BC) is the discipline support-
ing an organization in coping with the disruptive events
that may affect its IT infrastructure. The goal of BC
is guaranteeing that – after incidents – the infrastruc-
ture will recover operations within a predefined time.
This is achieved by carrying out a Business Continuity
Plan (BCP), which is part of the Risk Mitigation phase
of the Information Risk Management process. In gen-
eral, Risk Mitigation (RM) consists in developing and
implementing a strategy to manage potential harmful
threats to the information systems. Since risk may not
be completely avoided because of financial and prac-
tical limitations, RM (and BCP as well) includes the
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evaluation and the conscious acceptance of a residual
risk.
BC is quickly becoming best practice among both
enterprises and organizations also due to recent legis-
lation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002
or the Basel II [2] accord, which explicitly requires it.
Until recently, no widely agreed methodology was
available to carry out a BCP. The new standard
BS25999 [7], published in 2006 by the British Standard
Institute, has changed this situation providing guide-
lines to understand, develop and implement a BCP,
and aims to become a standard methodology. No-
tably, BS25999 requires an organization to (1) iden-
tify the activities/processes supporting the core ser-
vices used by the organization, (2) identify the re-
lationships/dependencies between activities/processes,
(3) evaluate the impact of the disruption of the core ser-
vices/processes previously identified (during the Busi-
ness Impact Analysis, BIA).
One of the main goals of any BCP is achieving that
crucial business processes should recover from disrup-
tion within a predefined Maximum Tolerable Period of
Disruption (MTPD). The MTPD expresses the max-
imum acceptable downtime to guarantee the business
continuity. As expected, the MTPD depends heavily
on the organization business goals and therefore is de-
fined on the business processes, and is determined by
the business unit.
Since business processes typically depend on a va-
riety of underlying IT assets, the MTPD has a direct
and indirect impact on the maximum downtime that
these assets may exhibit in practice. Indeed, the stan-
dard technical mean to realize a given MTPD is to
define Recovery Time Objectives (RTOs) on all IT as-
sets supporting business activities for which the BIA
has determined that it is necessary ensure continuity;
RTOs strongly depend on the technical and organiza-
tional measures the IT department implements to deal
with incidents.
Nowadays, determining the RTOs that apply to the
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IT assets is done manually, and is a subjective work
which heavily depends on the experience of the IT
personnel. This is not only error-prone, but it does
not scale well (to the point that it is very often not
done altogether, despite being required by the stan-
dard methodology). Moreover, it is inconvenient in
case of changes in the IT infrastructure or in the busi-
ness goals. In particular, new contracts and agreements
can have an impact on the quality of service a business
process should deliver and ultimately on the MTPD
associated to it. Likewise, changes in the IT infrastruc-
ture may affect dependencies and therefore the impact
of the IT assets on the business MTPDs. In both cases,
adapting the BCP to these changes usually requires a
costly new analysis involving both the IT and business
units of the organization.
We present a new model-based tool for supporting
the analysis of temporal dependencies among IT assets
and between IT assets and business process. The pri-
mary goals of our model and tool are (1) to support
the IT department in setting and validating the RTOs
of the IT assets of the organization (2) to evaluate as-
signed RTOs w.r.t. the given MTPD to find critical
points in the IT infrastructure. Ultimately, our model
allows to put down the fine-grained set of premises
and assumptions to infer that a given MTPD will be
achieved, thereby obtaining a more objective assess-
ment of the behaviour of the IT infrastructure.
While achieving these goals, we argue that our
model is particularly useful for continuously auditing
the BCP in various ways: first, the tool allows to visu-
alize immediately how changes in business goals or in
the IT infrastructure affect the compliance with given
(or modified) MTPDs; in particular it is possible to
compute whether the measures already in place con-
tinue giving enough guarantees also after the changes.
Secondly, it allows to validate the actual response of
the IT infrastructure w.r.t. the expected behaviour, al-
lowing a continuous refinement of the model which can
adapt to new external circumstances, allowing for early
detection of new threats to the business continuity tar-
gets.
Technically, our model is an improvement of the one
we presented in [18] for the optimization of countermea-
sures. The essential difference with the previous model
lies in the modelling of the recovery time after disrup-
tion, which in the present situation has to be much
more accurate. Notably, as we mention in Sec. 5, the
data our model requires is collected anyhow during a
BCP.
2 Time Dependency and Recovery
model
We now present the time dependency and recovery
(TDR) model, which allows us to model the response
of an organization to incidents. This model is based on
the TD model we introduced in [18] for the mitigation
of availability risks. In principle, the main difference
from the previous version is the way we model incidents
and their response time; in practice, the tool support-
ing it has completely different functionalities. The ba-
sic elements of the model are the constituents of the IT
infrastructure. The model is compatible with notable
architecture frameworks such as TOGAF [16], Zach-
man [17] and ArchiMate [1] as well as IT Governance
solutions (IBM [6] and ISACA [5]), to determine those
elements, which may directly or indirectly be involved
in an incident: Processes, Applications and Informa-
tion, Technology and Infrastructure or Facilities.
We start by providing a brief summary of the data
we need to build the model. (1) A representation of the
organization, consisting of: a set of entities (processes,
applications, etc.) and a set of relationships between
these entities. Relationships model which entities de-
pend on other entities and must contain an estimate of
how long an entity would be able to survive if another
entity it depends on becomes unavailable. (2) A list
of possible incidents affecting the IT infrastructure, to-
gether with the time needed to repair them (per entity)
given the controls already in place. We also need an
estimate of their expected frequency, in times per year.
(3) The MTPD value for each business process on the
dependency graph. (4) Optionally, a first estimate of
the RTO value for each entity (not business process)
on the dependency graph. In Sec. 5 we address the
problem of how and when this data can be collected
during the RA and BC processes.
Let us formalize the main notions. For this, we in-
dicate by R+ the set of positive real numbers, and by
T is the set of all time intervals (expressed in hours).
We represent a TDR model using a graph, where
nodes represent the basic entities and labelled edges
between nodes represent their relationships. The pres-
ence of an edge from node a to node b indicates that
b depends on a, and that if a becomes unavailable for
long enough, b will become unavailable as well. To
model this correctly, we also need to indicate how long
b will be able to survive without the presence of a. We
do that by annotating each edge with the survival time:
the time span the dependent entity can survive if the
other one fails.
Definition 1 A TDR model is a pair 〈N,→〉 where
N is a set of nodes and →⊆ N ×N × T .
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We write n1
t−→ n2 as shorthand for (n1, n2, t) ∈→.
A TDR model expresses e.g. the dependencies of hard-
ware components on the physical environment they are
located in, the dependency of an application on the ma-
chines it runs on, the dependency of an application on
another one feeding it at regular time intervals and the
dependency of a business process on the applications
supporting it. We will show in Sec. 4 that this graph
can be built in a fully automatic way.
Running example - Part 1 We present here an ex-
ample (oversimplified, to fit the example in the for-
mat of the paper) of the business/IT infrastructure of
a small bank segment with ten entities:
Id Description
p1 Customer management process
p2 Financial services process
a1 Home banking application
a2 On-line trading application
a3 Financial founds management application
db1 Checking account database
db2 Trading database
m1 Application server machine
m2 DBMS machine
m3 DBMS machine
n1 Network segment
p1 and p2 represent two business processes; a1, a2
and a3 are three applications and databases supporting
business processes while db1 and db2 are two databases
accessed by applications. Finally, m1, m2 and m3 are
the three machines running applications and n1 is the
network segment connecting the three machines. Fig-
Figure 1. A TDR model example
ure 1 shows a TDR model built with the entities from
Table 1. The edges connecting n1 to m1, m2 and m3
express the dependency of the machines on the network
connection with other machines. The connections from
m1 to a1, a2 and a3, from m2 to db1 and from m3 to
db2 express the dependency of software processes (ap-
plications or databases) on the machines they run on.
For all of these connections the survival time is set to
zero, since no entity can survive the disruption of the
ones it depends on, not even for a short time. In turn,
p1 depends on both a1 and a2, since the customer man-
agement is achieved by providing Internet banking and
on-line trading, but with different time constraints (five
hours for a1 and only one hour for a2). A similar rea-
soning apply to a1 and p2.
Notice that dependency relationships are and re-
lationships: a node depending on two or more other
nodes is disrupted even if just one of these are affected
by an incident. For the sake of simplicity, in this work
we do not consider or relationships, even though it
would be simple to include them in our model.
Incidents and their propagation From the mod-
elling side, the main innovation of the TDR model
w.r.t. the TD model lies in the representation of in-
cidents, which in the present case needs to be much
more accurate. Here, an incident is an event causing
an entity (or a set of entities) to break down and be-
come unavailable. Therefore, we identify an incident
with the set of entities it brings down. Since incidents
can happen several times a year, business continuity
should deal with the frequency of incidents to deter-
mine the proper strategies to be put in place.
Definition 2 Given a set of incidents I, the frequency
estimate freq, is a mapping I → R+ .
Finally, every disruptive event on an entity takes
some time to be repaired. Our model encompasses an
estimate of the repair time rt that is required by the
affected entities to become operational again. Here it
is important to notice that in many cases it is difficult
to guarantee a uniform repair time: repairing a disk
could take up to two hours in most cases (say, 90%
of the cases), but up to four hours in the remaining
(exceptional) 10% of the cases. For instance, a software
bug affecting a new application can be repaired in eight
hours if it is discovered during the week, or within 24
hours during the week-end, due to lack of personnel.
To be accurate, our model requires an estimate of the
revocery time for both the general and the exceptional
cases. For this reason rt is expressed as a frequency
distribution.
Definition 3 (Repair Time) Let Org = 〈N,→〉 be
an organization and I be a set of incidents. The repair
time rt is a mapping rt : N × I × T → R+ .
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The explicit modelling of the repair time as a fre-
quency distribution is the main theoretical difference
between this TDR model and the model we exposed
in [18], since dealing with BC requires a higher detail
level w.r.t. the average repair time needed to perform
just a risk assessment. Interestingly, the functionalities
of the tool we use here and those described in [18] are
completely different.
Every incident directly involves one or more entities,
causing them to be unavailable for a certain amount of
time. During this time the incident may propagate to
other entities, following the TDR model.
Definition 4 We say that an incident propagates
from a node n1 to n2, if they have a functional relation-
ship and the unavailability time of n1, due to the inci-
dent, exceeds the survival time of n2 w.r.t. n1 causing
n2 to become unavailable until the incident is resolved.
Running example - Part 2 The following graph
shows how an incident affecting m3 propagates across
our organization
Assume that an incident i occurs at t = 0 and it
is repaired within nine hours after t. It brings down
m3; at the same time db2 becomes unavailable, since
its survival time w.r.t. m3 is zero. After five minutes
a2 goes down and and a3 follows after fifteen minutes.
Accordingly to the TDR model, after one hour from the
disruption of a2, process p1 goes down and after eight
hours p2 goes down as well. After i1 has been repaired,
nine hours after t, all entities are repaired in turn.
3 Assessing the RTO
Recall that our goal is assessing whether, during
the normal operation, the system will comply with the
Maximum Tolerable Period of Disruption that has been
determined (by the business unit) for the business rel-
evant processes. The formal definition is the following.
Definition 5 (MTPD) Let Org = 〈N,→〉 be an or-
ganization and P ⊂ N be the set of business processes,
the Maximum Tolerable Period of Disruption is a map-
ping MTPD : P → T .
Running example - Part 3 The two business pro-
cesses in our example are noticeably time-dependent,
because they both require customer interaction and, in
the case of p2, the operational disruption causes a di-
rect financial loss to the bank. For these reasons it is
reasonable to assume that the MTPD is very short, as
reported on the following table.
Id Description MTPD
p1 Customer management process 3h
p2 Financial services process 0.5h
3.1 Complying with the MTPD
One of our goals is to check under which circum-
stances we can expect to be able to comply with the
MTPD (i.e., we can expect all business processes to re-
cover from disruptions within the maximum time given
by the MTPD). To this end, our model allows us to de-
termine, given the MTPD for the business critical pro-
cesses, what is the maximum recovery time that each
entity in the TDR model has to respect. Assuming
that the organizational graph is acyclic1, this can be
defined as follows.
Definition 6 (mrt) Let Org〈N,→〉 be an organiza-
tion, and let µ be an instance of the MTPD function
for Org, then for each n ∈ N we define the maximum
recovery time of n (w.r.t. µ) mrtµ(n) to be
• mrtµ(n) = µ(n) if n is a business process,
• mrtµ(n) = min{mrtµ(m) + d | n d−→ m}
Assuming that the TDR model is faithful, i.e. that
it reflects well how incidents propagate across the orga-
nization, the relevance of the maximum recovery time
is given by the following result
Proposition 7 Let Org〈N,→〉 be an organization,
P ⊂ N be the set of business processes, and µ be a
MTPD for it. If an incident on entity n ∈ N r P
is not repaired within mrtµ(n), then at least one busi-
ness process p ∈ P will be disrupted for longer than
its MTPD. On the other hand, if an incident on entity
n ∈ N r P is repaired within mrtµ(n), then no busi-
ness process p ∈ P will be disrupted for longer than its
MTPD.
Therefore, the mrtµ(n) we have calculated is actually
the maximum downtime we can tolerate on n to ensure
that the MTPD is respected for each business process
depending (directly or indirectly) on it. Of course, the
1In most cases, the organizational graph is acyclic, or can be
made acyclic by some preprocessing.
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validity of this result depends on the accuracy of the
TDR model, but it is worth mentioning here that (a)
as we discuss later, the data needed to build the TDR
model is in most cases readily available and (b) the
model can be refined in time by using statistics on in-
cidents and their recovery.
Recovery Time Objectives While the MTPD is
a high-level measure imposed on the critical business
processes, it is widely acknowledged that is should be
good practice (also required by standard BCP audit-
ing) to set a recovery time objective on all the IT assets
of the organization that can be directly involved in in-
cidents (machines, applications, infrastructure, etc. ).
Our tool can be used to do this in an automatic, fairly
user-friendly way. This already represent an improve-
ment on everyday practices, in which RTO are often
not set at all.
Definition 8 (RTO) Let Org = 〈N,→〉 be an orga-
nization and P ⊂ N be the set of business processes, the
Recovery Time Objective is a mapping RTO : NrP →
T .
Clearly, Proposition 7 implies that if for each node
n RTO(n) ≤ mrtmt(n), then the compliance with re-
spect to the RTO implies compliance w.r.t. MTPD.
Our model allows us to validate the RTO imposed on
the organization as follows.
Proposition 9 Let Org〈N,→〉 be an organization,
and rto be an RTO for it. Assume that for each
n,m ∈ N such that n d−→ m the following holds
(1) RTO(n) ≤ RTO(m)− d
Then for any two entities n and m holds that an inci-
dent on the entity n ∈ N which causes on n a disrup-
tion shorter than RTO(n) will never cause by propaga-
tion on m a disruption longer than RTO(m).
In other words, with our model we can validate the
RTO imposed on the entities by checking that they
are truly pairwise compatible. If (1) is not satisfied
for some n, m, then an incident on n which causes on
n a downtime shorter than RTO(n) would cause on
m by propagation a downtime longer than RTO(m).
In other words, if (1) is not satisfied then one could
witness the paradoxical situation that the RTO onm is
not satisfied because of an incident on another entity n,
while this incident remained within the RTO of n in the
first place. RTOs are meant to define a local standard
that guarantees a global continuity level; because of
this we believe that an RTO not respecting (1) would
be of no practical use.
Running example - Part 4 By applying an algo-
rithm based on Prop. 7, to the TDR model in Fig. 1,
we evaluate the mrt for each entity w.r.t. the MTPD
expressed in the previous example. The graph below re-
ports the original RTO value assigned in the traditional
way (i.e. manually) by the IT-BCP group on the IT
assets of the TDR model as well as the automatically
evaluated mrt.
Id RTO mrt
a1 6h 8h
a2 6h 4h
a3 6h 24h 30’
db1 5h 8h 10’
db2 5h 4h 5’
m1 5h 4h
m2 7h 8h 10’
m3 3h 4h 5’
n1 8h 4h
The traditionally assessed RTO in some cases is too
short and in other cases it is too long, i.e. insufficient
to ensure the business continuity. By applying Prop. 9,
we compare the original RTO w.r.t. the mrt and find
four critical points (outlined by a red circle in the figure
below), where the original RTO value exceeds the mrt.
3.2 Exceeding the MTPD
As it is impossible to achieve total security, it is
often difficult to comply all the times with the given
MTPD. Disasters happen and an it is normal to ac-
cept a residual risk that implies that the given MTPD
may be exceeded in truly exceptional situations. For
instance, there could be some particularly serious inci-
dents that cannot be recovered in time. On the other
hand the IT department may be unprepared to handle
some disruptive events due to lack of personnel or re-
sources. To deal with that, two ways are possible: (1)
the organization’s management decides to employ more
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resources and deploy new controls allowing to shorten
the disruption time, or (2) the risk of exceeding the
MTPD is accepted within a given probability.
However, to be able to accept the risk of exceeding
the MTPD, an organization needs to have a reasonable
estimate of how often this is going to happen in a given
time frame (which could be one year or ten years, for
instance).
To this end, we can use our TDR model. We know
from Prop. 7 that every time an incident occurring on
an entity is not repaired within its mrt one or more
business processes depending on the entity will become
unavailable for longer than their MTPD.
Therefore, to evaluate the frequency a business pro-
cess p exceeds its MTPD we need to know how many
occurrences of the incidents, affecting the entities on
which p (directly or indirectly) depends on, exceed
their mrt. To this end we use the recovery time dis-
tribution that is evaluated during the risk assessment
phase.
Definition 10 Let n ∈ N be an entity, p ∈ P be a
business process and mt = MTPD(p) be its MTPD.
If I is the set of incidents affecting n, the frequency n
exceeds its mrt because of incidents I is:
Φ(n, I) =
∑
i∈I
freq(i)×
∑
t>mrtmt(n)
rt(n, i, t)
Intuitively, Φ(n, I) expresses the number of times an
entity n exceeds its mrt because of a set of incidents I.
The following proposition expresses how we use Φ to
evaluate the how many times is exceeded the MTPD
for a given business process p, Fex(p).
Proposition 11 Let p be a business process and Ep
be the set of entities on which p depends on, directly
or by propagation. If ∀m ∈ Ep, Im is the set of all the
incident that can occur on m then:
(2) Fex(p) =
∑
m∈Ep
Φ(m, Im)
In other words, the frequency a process exceeds its
MTPD is determined by the sum of the frequencies the
entities it depends on exceed their mrt. With such an
information the business unit is able to verify if the
residual risk it is willing to accept is not further ex-
ceeded by the IT department. Such a condition would
require the development of more effective strategies to
reduce the recovery time to incidents.
Running example - Part 5 Let us introduce two in-
cidents i1 and i2, the first affecting A2, the second af-
fecting DB2. i1 is estimated to happen five times a
year and it is repaired within three hours in the 80% of
the cases and within eight hours in the remaining 20%.
i2 is estimated to happen seven times a year and it is
repaired within four hours in the 90% of the cases and
within six hours in the remaining 10%. If we consider
the MTPD of P1 (three hours), then the mrt is 4h for
A2 and 4h5’ for DB2. The frequency DB2 exceeds its
mrt is 0.7 times a year while the frequency A2 exceeds
its mrt is 1 time a year. Consequently, assuming the
only incidents affecting the entities in the TDR model
are i1 and i2, our tool allows us to comute that P1 is
expected to exceed its MTPD 1.7 times a year (once a
year by 3h equivalent to the 200% of the MTPD and
0.7 times a year by 1h55’ equivalent to the 164% of the
MTPD).
4 The Practice
Our experience on BCP auditing is based on the
general approach used by KPMG Italy. Regarding the
BIA, the procedure that is commonly used within orga-
nizations to establish the MTPD for the business pro-
cesses is based on the qualitative analysis of the impact
as perceived by the process owner (business unit), of
the consequences of a disruption on the process itself.
On the other hand, regarding RTOs, only certain enti-
ties (most of the applications) are taken into consider-
ation and are labeled with a RTO, since it is difficult
to properly evaluate the relationships between the dif-
ferent entities manually.
The first important contribution of our model is that
all the relationships are properly evaluated thus en-
abling the IT department to extract the RTO values
for each involved entity (even machines, networks and
infrastructures).
We implemented our model with a tool designed to
be an additional component of KARISMA (which is
the tool developed at KPMG to support Risk Assess-
ment, see Sec. 5): this enables us to repeat and validate
the assessment previously done by the KPMG auditing
team. The tool is based on the TDR model as an an-
notated graph by representing each entry with a node
and each link with an edge between nodes, annotated
with the survival time. It is provided with algorithms
directly derived from the framework proposed in Sec. 3.
We tested our model on a KARISMA database of
an Italian primary insurance company. This data
was collected during an auditing activity carried out
by KPMG, and contains information regarding the
TDR model (19 macro business processes and 122 sub-
processes) and the results of the BIA analysis providing
the MTPD value for each sub-process. The remaining
information required by our model (about incidents,
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Figure 2. An example of critical point found
with our tool. The misleading evaluation of
A2’s RTO to 7h is caused by the lack in con-
sidering the relationship of A2 with A1. If A2
is repaired in more than 6h, process P1 will
be disrupted for more than its MTPD.
repair time and frequencies) was also provided by the
KPMG auditing team who conducted the assessment.
We achieved two results: first we were able to as-
sign an RTO to all the entities of the TDR model by
using the maximum recovery time automatically cal-
culated by the tool. This allows the IT department
to assess its ability to comply with its RTOs and, if
necessary, arrange with the business unit an exceeding
rate. Second, we found some critical points in the pre-
vious setting of RTO for the applications. In case of
applications supporting more than one business process
and other applications, we found that the RTO was in
some cases either very close to the mrt (in which case
it becomes critical) or it was underestimated (longer
than required) because, as we mentioned before, the
relationships between applications were not taken into
consideration properly (see Fig. 2).
Summarizing, our tool allows one to automatically
perform two different assessments: firstly to set prop-
erly RTO values for a given business process. Secondly,
to support auditors during the BCP validation. Once a
BCP has been established and put in place, the valida-
tion phase occurs to ensure that the plan is adequate,
complete and appropriate w.r.t. the organization’s in-
formation system [14]. A crucial point is based on the
auditing of recovery controls: the auditor must ver-
ify that RTO values meet the business requirements.
Our tool supports this kind of verification, since every
check is made in an automatic way, possibly discover-
ing weaknesses in the BCP.
5 Discussion
In this section we argue the feasibility of our ap-
proach and its usefulness to support continuous audit-
ing of the BCP.
Feasibility and Validation The main concern re-
garding the feasibility of our approach is whether the
required set of data is easy to collect. If this was not
the case, organizations would not be willing to accept
it. Fortunately, the data it requires is typically avail-
able after RA and BCP: first of all, an accurate map of
the IT infrastructure, is readily available after a BCP
carried out following the BS25999 [7] standard (and is
also after RAs). Secondly, an inventory of possible in-
cidents, together with their frequency has to be com-
piled during the RA. Finally, a BCP should provide
(accordingly to BS25999 standard) a complete evalu-
ation of the effectiveness of chosen incident response
strategies.
To further substantiate our argument, we note that
this data is also collected by tools devised to assist
the RA and RM processes. For instance, the Italian
branch of KPMG [11] (a worldwide company deliver-
ing also Information Risk Advisory services) has de-
veloped a customizable tool, KARISMA (Kpmg Ad-
vanced RISk MAnagement), to support their RA activ-
ities. Among the information KARISMA collects via a
question-driven procedure, there is a map of the busi-
ness process entities (together with their relationships)
and the Business Impact Analysis values. KARISMA
is based on COBIT, and it is very likely that other
tools for RA based on COBIT would collect the same
information. Our system can thus be regarded as an
additional component for KARISMA or for any other
COBIT-based tool for RA, supporting in particular the
Business Continuity Planning activity.
We also note that most of the information required
to build the TDR model is also available when apply-
ing to an organization an architectural framework, such
as TOGAF [16], Zachman [17] and ArchiMate [1]. In-
deed, the layers defined in those frameworks are similar
to the ones we adopt for our model, though used for
different purposes (e.g. architectural support, new com-
ponent impact evaluation, etc.). Since those projects
are widely employed (ArchiMate for instance is used
by ABN Amro and the Dutch Tax Office), and are
supported by several tools, they provide us an indirect
confirmation of the feasibility of actually obtaining the
data needed by our model.
Summarizing, our tool does not require organiza-
tions to acquire new information (i.e. to employ new
resources), rather it uses in a different way the infor-
mation already available after RA and BCP.
Continuous Auditing Finally, we argue that our
framework is particularly useful to support a contin-
uous auditing process. The concept of continuous
auditing is well-known among the risk management
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strategies, particularly in the field of software engineer-
ing [13]. The goal of this process is continuously assess-
ing what could go wrong in projects (i.e., what the risks
are), determining which of these risks are most rele-
vant, and implementing strategies to deal with them.
Even though many of the methodologies for risk man-
agement [5, 3, 8], as well as those for BC [7], include
a monitoring and reviewing step, this process can be
performed with different degrees of granularity, accord-
ing on how flexible the methodology is. For example, a
change on the IT infrastructure, involving the disman-
tling of a set of applications and machines and the in-
troduction of new software and hardware components,
may involve either the assessment of the new compo-
nents only or of the whole organization, depending on
how much it is possible to reuse the previous assess-
ment results.
Thanks to the fine granularity and the high degree of
independence of the used information (time dependen-
cies, assessment of incidents, importance of processes
to the business), our model and tool are particularly
suitable to support a continuous assessment process.
For instance, when dealing with a change in the or-
ganization, be it the rearrangement of the IT infras-
tructure or a new business strategy, after a simple up-
date of the model the framework can be used to eval-
uate the new time constraints within which incidents
must be repaired to preserve the business continuity. In
the case a new component is added to the information
system, it is only necessary to add the new compo-
nent in the TDR model and specify its functional and
temporal relationships with the other components to
evaluate its new RTO. On the other hand, if (due to
changes in business strategy) a process becomes more
important for the organization’s business, it is possible
to change its MTPD and automatically assess the IT
infrastructure to verify if it is still able to ensure the
new time constraints.
In addition, after the occurrence of an incident, our
model allows to verify if the incident response propaga-
tion is compliant to the expected behaviour. It might
happen that a time dependency between two applica-
tions, that was estimated to be of one hour, is in fact of
one hour and a half. Furthermore, it might be observed
that the response time to an incident exceeds the fore-
casted RTO. In those cases, the model can be easily
updated with the new collected information, thereby
allowing to rapidly assess the new situation and de-
velop new and more efficient BC strategies, if needed.
This feature adds quality to our solution since it en-
ables the BC team to organically capitalize on practi-
cal experience to improve accuracy of the model and
of the outcome in time.
In this perspective, the ability to easily refine the
model helps at improving the way organizations tradi-
tionally deal with incidents. Instead of simply solving
the problem when it happens and then forgetting about
it, our solution promotes the continuous monitoring of
the performances of the repair operations by collect-
ing new information as incidents occur and then use
them to improve the efficiency of the response on new
occurrences.
Summarizing, our system allows one to (a) easily ad-
just the model to changes in the organization and/or
its business target, without the need of a complete new
assessment, and (b) refine the model (i.e., make it more
precise) in the moment that new more accurate infor-
mation is available about the actual behaviour of the
organization.
6 Related Work
Although the Business Continuity Planning process
is well described in a number of works [12, 9] and re-
cently has been standardized by the British Standard
Institute [7], formal models to support it are still un-
derstudied. Despite this situation there are some spe-
cific fields for which specific tools have been developed
to accurately evaluate the survivability of IT systems.
This is the case of telecommunication networks, where
the high availability of the network must be ensured
through a proper BCP. Jrad et al. [10] propose a BCP
model devised to determine the expected downtime due
to disaster events as well as normal and software fail-
ures in a networked environment and especially tai-
lored for the IT infrastructure of telecommunication
networks. The model can be used to predict the prob-
ability that a disaster will cause a service disruption.
Even though their approach may be extended to all IT
networked infrastructures, we believe that it does not
properly evaluate the dependencies between the con-
stituents of the IT infrastructure, and in particular the
survival time between them. Furthermore our model is
explicitly designed to assess the current RTOs and de-
termine critical points, whatever the technique is used
to determine incidents likelihood and response time.
Another approach to evaluate the survivability of a
system is the one proposed by Cloth and Haverkort
in [4]. They describe the system under assessment as a
Stochastic Petri Net and then automatically convert
it into a Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC).
Finally they use a model checking engine to obtain
a time-probability chart that expresses the recovery
probability in relation to the recovery time. The scope
of their approach (1) is limited to a particular dis-
tributed environment, where a much more fine grained
8
description of the system is considered and (2) only the
recovery time is the desired output. This is a very ap-
preciated requirement when dealing with dependabil-
ity issues in system design, but is not suitable for large
infrastructures considered in BCP. On the other hand,
our approach is devised to assess the compatibility with
the business unit requirements with those ensured by
the IT department.
In addition to academic work there exist a number
of commercial tools supporting BCP. The most closely
related to our work is Shadow Planner [15]. It is an
(industrial) application developed to support organiza-
tions in assessing risks and establish a BCP. The soft-
ware has several modules to map the organizations’s
IT infrastructure, collect BIA information, asset val-
ues and etc. Thus, it is able to evaluate the monetary
impact of a certain incident. Differently from our ap-
proach, it is not based on a model and the relationships
between different entities are not properly evaluated.
This could hardly affect the way a disruption event is
evaluated, resulting in an erroneous planning of coun-
termeasures to ensure business process MTPDs (and
the related RTOs).
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